烏俄戰事記要(10/24 全線作戰 )

economic

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economic

個人積分：330438分

文章編號：88486863

nomo333 wrote:
❗ 在...(恕刪)

那改變不了俄羅斯投入的部隊只有差不多抵銷烏克蘭前來支援的部隊的大致狀況的現實
最基本的就看有沒有實際拿下來
我起碼敢說除非俄羅斯很快下決心更大量快速地投入至少5000以上的兵力
不然我立個標籤
11/15之前俄羅斯拿不下整個阿夫迪夫卡

那種非常局部的微小優勢改變不了還是拿不下這塊地方的事實
事後諸葛的角度來看
如果俄羅斯早幾周就在這邊有5000人以上的部隊
然後10天前就肯直接投進去
那現在拿下整個阿夫迪夫卡的機率超過70%
甚至可以帶動整個士氣
而烏克蘭在丟掉阿夫迪夫卡的士氣有可能大受影響
這是有相當機率影響最近幾個月整體戰局的算是相對重要的時機點

以目前看到的雙方投入狀況
起碼幾周內俄羅斯拿不下來的
那即使小局部地區有相對好一點的成果對整體來說意義很小

一雙玉臂千人枕、半點朱唇萬客嚐，還君明珠雙淚垂、恨不相逢未嫁時

殲二十

800分

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殲二十

個人積分：800分

文章編號：88487162

economic wrote:
那只是你自己覺得
俄羅斯拿原來那樣會被阿夫迪夫卡炮擊的頓巴斯當止步?
那還不是火箭彈喔
砲兵就可以對居民區砲火打擊這樣俄羅斯軍事目的可以接受?
我只會說你要這樣大外行那真的跟你說話純屬浪費時間

是你自己覺得只是我覺得。
俄國可不可以接受，你也不用問我，俄國已經給過答案了。
你回想下幾個月前，俄國佔了四州後是不是就表態願意停戰?
你天天上ｍobile，也不是住在斷網的深山裏，應該知道吧。
事實就是這樣，說別人大外行不會顯得你內行。回報你

當時俄國願意停戰就是能接受了，是烏國要反攻回去才沒能停戰。
現在情勢變了，就算司機要求停戰認賠已丟的領土，普京也未必肯答應。

MiPiace

14739分

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MiPiace

個人積分：14739分

文章編號：88487431

他的評論，我一直認為是最專業的，只是現在能看到的評論有限，他的網站要付費。
有興趣就看看吧，他修正他原來對 Avdiivka 俄軍戰術的看法。
我把整篇英文貼上來，方便閱讀。

An important aspect of being a decent analyst is the periodic review of one's prior work, retrospectively evaluating its accuracy, pinpointing mistakes, and gaining insight into the reasons behind incorrect conclusions.

In line with this approach, I have revisited some of my earlier analyses and located inaccurate conclusions. Perhaps the most important error I made was downplaying the probability of a major offensive by the Russian forces by the end of this year.

In the earlier part of this year and during the early fall, I reached the conclusion that Russian forces were engaged in training exercises with reserves, refurbishing units, and replenishing vehicle losses. My assessment at the time was that Russia would preserve an adequate defensive capability, but I failed to foresee their ability to launch an army-level operation by year-end.

While I observed substantial brigade and corps-sized formations, their state of readiness and positions suggested a role as reserves poised to respond to emerging threats rather than serving as an offensive mechanized force. Consequently, I mistakenly concluded that the Russians wouldn't deploy these units in significant offensive operations. This perspective seemed reasonable to me, especially in the context of the ongoing Ukrainian counter-offensive. My assessment was further reinforced when the Russians initiated their own counter-attack in the Kupyansk direction, where the enemy employed platoon, company, and reinforced company forces for assaults, rather than launching a large-scale, army-level operation.

One of the scenarios I had considered as quite probable was that the Russians would wait until our forces exhausted their offensive capabilities in Robotyne and then counter-attack with company-sized units, with the objective of limiting our gains from the counter-offensive.

Instead, they launched an army-level offensive operation against one of the most fortified and well-defended segments of the frontline, using forces I had mistakenly labeled as response reserves. The results have been roughly in line with what I had expected - shockingly high losses, with a documented count of at least 109 vehicles, each verified by satellite imagery. If you haven't had the chance to review this data, I strongly recommend doing so. By this time, the actual count is likely closer to 200 vehicles.

Given my anticipation of such significant losses, I had assumed that the Russian command would refrain from launching army-level operations, at least until the following year.

The question that naturally emerges is why they proceeded with this operation despite the foreseen high losses. If I could foresee such losses, it's reasonable to assume the Russians could as well. This raises the question of whether they have regained sufficient confidence to execute corps and army-level operations against the most challenging defenses, even at the cost of unacceptable casualties. If they had been planning this operation for a considerable duration, as the evidence suggests, it prompts us to consider whether they genuinely think that this is a sustainable approach.

This should serve as a wake-up call for many. Russia is still a significant presence and capable of causing harm. The situation in Avdiivka remains challenging, with the enemy exerting pressure using a large number of vehicles, infantry, and air support. It highlights the necessity for a thorough and meticulous reassessment of the enemy's capabilities, while also underscoring the critical importance of military aid to Ukraine. This aid is indispensable to ensure that Ukraine possesses the essential resources to stop Russia and liberate occupied territories.

01newbie

感覺是很委婉地說，我之前判斷錯誤，現在Avdiivka守不住了

2023-10-25 10:08

nomo333

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nomo333

個人積分：980分

文章編號：88487901

economic wrote:
那改變不了俄羅斯投入...(恕刪)

立什麼標籤
搞笑
投入很多兵力
就一定要很快拿下阿夫迪夫卡嗎？
俄軍在進攻時就說
他們指揮部雖然有壓時間
但不會打很快

nomo333

980分

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nomo333

個人積分：980分

文章編號：88487904

❗今天。我們的人已經前進了 5 公里多。在 Krasnogorovka 西南部的 Avdiivka 方向。

此外，在 Krasnogorovka 以北，我軍也佔領了另一個林區。

~~~~~~~~~~

❗ 關於 Avdiivka 方向。他們在 Krasnogorovka 一側取得了成功。在 Vodyanoye 和 Opytnoye 一側則有問題，士兵們處於守勢。對他們來說，這比從克拉斯諾戈羅夫卡出發要困難得多。保重，小伙子們