因為用估狗翻譯實在看不懂，這是我有興趣的文章，但是實在看不懂專有名詞的英文
The 2000s have seen a prolonged period of low levels of interest rates in market-based
economies, matched with liberalized banking systems and considerable expansion of credit.
Mainstream economic theory and policy aligned with the adoption of free market policies, has
viewed these developments as a recipe for accelerated growth and economic prosperity (see e.g.
Shleifer, 2009). This belief is probably true if one considers the macroeconomic and
technological advancement of the last three decades. However, the strength and the nature of the
recent global financial crisis that unfolded to a recession in 2008, reminded us once again that
the efficient functioning of the banking system is not only a matter of liberalization and
integration; it also requires a comprehensive assessment of bank risk and a restraint of associated
risk-taking incentives of banks.
Using a recent line of theoretical and empirical literature as a springboard, this study has
aimed to isolate the impact of the long-drawn-out period of low levels of interest rates on the
risk-taking behavior of banks. The empirical analysis, conducted on a large panel of euro area
banks, revealed a strong negative relationship between bank risk-taking and interest rates. Thus,
the low interest-rate environment unambiguously increased risk-related bank assets and altered
the composition of euro area bank portfolios toward a more risky position. We also found that
this negative relationship is stronger for banks that engage in non-traditional banking activities
(higher volume of off-balance sheet items) and weaker (but still significant) for banks with high
levels of capitalization.
We contend that these findings point out to policy considerations toward three main
directions. First and foremost, central banks should consider the risk-loving bank behavior within
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a low interest-rate environment when setting monetary policy. All in all, an aftermath of this
crisis may be that monetary policy and financial stability are interrelated and this necessitates the
development of a new theoretical framework, where financial stability enters into the Taylor rule
framework. Second, given that non-traditional bank activities and capitalization seem to play a
central role in banks’ risk-taking behavior, institution-building and the restoration of competent
and effective regulatory and supervisory power over these bank characteristics may hold the key
to a more prudent bank behavior. Finally, and related to the above, it seems apparent that
discussions surrounding the revitalization of a Glass-Steagal type of separation of bank activities,
or banks internalizing the cost of regulation especially during good times, may be interrelated
with decisions concerning the demand and the supply of credit in general and the level of interest
rates in particular.
