殲-20和F-22究竟誰更強大? 楊偉總設計師:殲-20設計理念要整整領先一代!

davis0725 wrote:
上次不是無聲無息飛到(恕刪)


反了吧。。。

美F22隐身战机遭"破功" ,俄苏35火控雷达将其准确锁定

https://mil.sina.cn/sd/2018-10-02/detail-ifxeuwws0301739.d.html?from=wap

月24号,一名俄罗斯战斗机飞行员在自己的社交网站上公布了两张苏-35战斗机锁定F-22战斗机的照片。根据照片和附带公布的信息可知,照片是红外模式拍到的,首先苏-35的红外雷达OLS-35发现了F-22,后火控雷达完成锁定。OLS-35的作用距离只有50km,因此两者的距离在这一范围内。

賣身的牛郎 wrote:
反了吧。。。美F22...(恕刪)


英國佬,在1991沙漠風暴就說,雷達可以抓到F117。都三十年了,在排隊買F35。
嘴砲太先進了。

三十年前,我中學就能,自制賤20模型飛機,吃電的保證飛五分鐘。吃油的二十分鐘。
保證雷達抓不到,因為只能爬升30米。
還有飛狼直升機喔!
(直九)

很強的,還可以攜帶,對空對地沖天炮數隻。

只怕警察抓,無敵手。
你們的制度不利私部門創新,偷跟抄讓你們的底子虛。不要吹,還有很長的路要走。

Engine Trouble: Why China Needs a Domestically-Produced Air Force
Beijing is too reliant on foreign weapons and technologies, despite attempts to build up its own self-reliance.

by Robert Farley

Key Point: China is making progress on domestic industries and eventually probably won't be as reliant on Russian imports or stolen U.S. technology. However, that day is still a fair ways off.

The Chinese defense industrial base is infamous for its tendency to “borrow” from foreign designs, particularly in the aerospace industry. Almost the entirety of China’s modern fighter fleet have either borrowed liberally from or directly copied foreign models. The J-10 was reputedly based on the Israeli IAI Lavi and by extension the United States’ General Dynamics F-16; the J-11 is a clone of the Russian Su-27; the JF-17 is a modern development of the Soviet MiG-21; the J-20 bears an uncanny resemblance to the F-22, and finally, the J-31 is widely believed to rely heavily on technology appropriated from the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter. Appropriation saves China time and money on research and development, allowing it to modernize the PLAAF at a fraction of the cost of its competitors. However, the appropriation strategy remains constrained by bottleneck technologies due to lack of testing data and industrial ecology. This problem is starkly illustrated by China’s ongoing difficulty in producing a high-quality indigenous jet engine.

The problem of technology mismatch, at its root, is that the thief lacks trade secrets and human capital associated with the manufacturing and assembly of a system. At the very least, this absence can make the replication of foreign systems a costly and time-consuming process, as the thief needs to develop manufacturing procedures from scratch. At worst, it can lead to seriously substandard components that reduce the capabilities and reliability of a system. Chinese efforts to reverse engineer certain Russian jet engines during the 1990s and 2000s invariably produced engines with extremely short lifespans, and without the power of their Russian counterparts. Even today, jet engines remain an obstacle for PLAAF fighter modernization, with its early 5th generation prototypes notably underpowered. Further complicating the problem, Russia is wary of supplying engines more powerful than the AL-31 used to power its Su-27s. However, China has several avenues to work around this.

The most obvious option is simply to build a better indigenous engine. In 2016, China’s 13th Five-year Plan for the National Development of Strategic Emerging Industries emphasized the importance of improving the performance of indigenous jet-engine designs and the further development of the aerospace industry. It appears that there has been at least some success, as the latest J-20 prototypes are powered by upgraded WS-10 engines that are supposedly stealthier and more powerful than the AL-31. However, the lack of public information regarding China’s indigenous engine programs makes their true quality difficult to ascertain. Early models of the WS-10 used to power Chinese Flankers proved dramatically inferior to the AL-31. While the privately owned Chengdu Aerospace Superalloy Technology Company (CASTC) has recently made great advances in turbofan technology, allowing for hotter, more efficient engines, the fruits of its breakthrough have yet to reach frontline PLAAF units.

If the private sector proves key to breaking through various technological bottlenecks in elements of aerospace design, then political ramifications may follow. Presently, state-owned aviation manufacturers are politically ascendant, with some state-owned enterprise leaders even granted governorships. If privately owned firms like CASTC produce superior results, they may rise in political influence, the more established and politically connected state firms could consume them, or they could form comprehensive public-private partnerships with state-owned firms while retaining a degree of autonomy. Whatever the case, the implications could be profound for the Chinese defense industrial base and national innovation system.

A simpler method is to buy foreign fighters that have advanced engines, as was the case with the PLAAF’s purchase of Su-35s from Russia. The Su-35’s AL-41F1S, alternatively known as the ALS-117S, is an exceptionally powerful thrust-vectoring engine which represents a quantum leap over the AL-31. While China originally expressed interest in the ALS-117 as a stand-alone product, Russia’s refusal to export the engine alone necessitated the purchase of the Su-35. Russia insists that extensive IP protections safeguard the ALS-117 from Chinese reverse engineering. However, given China’s questionable record of respecting intellectual property, it is plausible that they will attempt to reverse-engineer parts of the ALS-117 anyway, although this is harder than it sounds. Russian sources claim it is nearly impossible to reach the “heart” of the engine without breaking it. Furthermore, China’s previous difficulties with the WS-10, despite ready access to the AL-31, show that access to foreign engine designs does not immediately translate into the ability to produce engines of similar quality. Furthermore, disrespecting Russian IP protections it had agreed to honor might restrict China’s access to advanced Russian systems in the future. Finally, if the Russians are correct that it is effectively impossible to access the ALS-117’s core without breaking it completely, attempts at reverse-engineering it would rob the PLAAF of advanced combat aircraft that would quite obviously be useless without engines. Thus, while the PRC may derive short-term advantage from reverse engineering the ALS-117, it risks killing the goose that laid the golden egg. However, the grim prognosis for the future of the Russian arms industry may force it to look the other way, as losing access to the Chinese market would be a body blow. Russia’s leverage is also shrinking; as China’s technological and industrial base improves, the importance of Russian imports continues to decrease. Beijing may feel confident enough in the disparate power differential to call Moscow’s bluff. Yet doing so risks derailing the positive relationship in which the two countries have invested considerable diplomatic capital.

Finally, China could use its bourgeoning civilian jet industry as a springboard from which to derive military applications. This certainly has its advantages. A focus on civilian aviation opens up greater opportunities for cooperation with Western firms while opening up new export markets for Chinese aviation technology. For example, Germany is interested in purchasing Chinese turbine blades, which are said to be superior to German designs in many ways (ironically, much of this expertise comes from China gobbling up German companies.) Additionally, it meets a domestic need, as China is the world’s largest market for civilian aircraft. However, American and European companies operate under severe restrictions regarding technology transfer, undercutting their ability to provide useful information. Additionally, political pressure or IP theft could scare away Western aerospace firms just as they are starting to invest in Chinese production. With intellectual property theft already a key point of contention, this could further exacerbate declining Sino-American relations and add fuel to the fire of a trade war. The result could damage the very industrial base China is trying to expand and modernize.

Despite these formidable obstacles, Chinese advancement in military aviation continues apace, and it is unlikely that China will lag behind in engine technology forever. Advances in 3D printing may yet provide a way for it to rapidly build, prototype, and develop jet engines. However, while 3D printing is already used by militaries worldwide to produce parts for aircraft and ships, it has yet to produce a modern military-grade turbofan jet engine. Given the inherent complexity of such a task, it will likely take several years for such technology to mature enough for widespread implementation. For now, it appears that the PRC must make difficult choices if it is to master fighter engine design, and thus maximize the effectiveness of its air arm.

原文: https://nationalinterest.org/blog/reboot/engine-trouble-why-china-needs-domestically-produced-air-force-177993

J. Tyler Lovell is a graduate of the University of Kentucky's Patterson School of Diplomacy and aspiring PhD student. He has been previously published in the popular defense website Foxtrot Alpha and the foreign policy blog Fellow Travelers.

Robert Farley, a frequent contributor to TNI, is a Visiting Professor at the United States Army War College. The views expressed are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the Army, Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government. This article first appeared earlier and is being reposted due to reader interest.
其實...這個說法我是覺得有一些道理的

我就不說中國J-20如何,但是美國的F-22與F-35的世代就是有差距

如果F-22的航電系統無法升級,我想它的壽命可能就會縮短

比方說F-117A服役時間出奇的短,也許它的功能可被其他機型取代,但是...也不用那麽急著就除役吧?畢竟...它還算是一款隱形戰機
>>.....F-117A服役時間出奇的短......

這是官方的說法.......
衡山劉正風 wrote:
其實...這個說法我(恕刪)


F16都可以变F16V...真🈶️对手能威胁到的时候, 国会自然会掏钱
衡山劉正風 wrote:
其實...這個說法我(恕刪)
使用成本貴,而且f22已經服役效果更好,功用重疊成本翻倍,2選一,甚至當時f35已經有譜快量產.....保留f117a有何作用?
可悲,陽痿設計的破飛機只能拿來給小粉紅自慰用。f-22都出來多久了,再10年MLU後姦20還不一定射得了,因為陽痿啊!!全世界只有腦殘中共會花幾千億造出模型飛機
之離異 wrote:
杨伟

非也非也...是 "楊偉" 總設計師...
我說這設計師的父母到底是不是親生的..這取名..也太隨便了吧
就不怕從小被人叫陽痿.."叫出陰影嗎?
我想信IDF會更厲害唷
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