====轉貼 經濟學人訪談柯文哲 (GPT英翻中)==== Taiwan’s opposition parties are struggling to unite 台灣的反對黨正努力團結 An interview with the island-democracy’s political wild card, Ko Wen-je 一次針對這個島嶼民主國家的政治異數柯文哲的訪談
Oct 26th 2023 | TAIPEI 2023年10月26日 | 台北
Taiwan is a young democracy. It has had direct presidential elections only since 1996. Each time the race has come down to two main parties: the Nationalist Party, or kmt, which wants reunification with China, and the pro-independence Democratic Progressive Party (dpp). Ahead of the election due in January, a third force has emerged. Ko Wen-je, a former mayor of Taipei and founder of the new Taiwan People’s Party (tpp), is polling at 20-25%, on a par with the kmt’s candidate, Hou Yu-ih. This has introduced complexity to the election and huge uncertainty about the island-state’s future approach to China. 台灣是一個年輕的民主國家。它自1996年才開始進行直接總統選舉。每次選舉都僅有兩個主要政黨參與:希望與中國統一的國民黨(kmt)和支持獨立的民主進步黨(dpp)。在即將於明年一月舉行的選舉前,出現了第三勢力。前台北市市長、新台灣民眾黨(tpp)創黨人柯文哲的支持率達到20-25%,與國民黨候選人侯友宜不相上下。這使得選舉變得複雜,對於台灣未來對中國的態度也產生了巨大的不確定性。
Neither Mr Ko nor Mr Hou looks able to win on his own. The former mayor’s rise has come mainly at the kmt’s expense; at Taiwan’s presidential election in 2020 its candidate won almost 40% of the vote. And the late entry into the race of a bombastic independent candidate, Terry Gou, the billionaire founder of Foxconn, a Taiwanese manufacturer, has further split the anti-dpp vote. Yet if Mr Ko and Mr Hou could do a deal to unite their parties behind one candidate, the situation would change. Together they might defeat the ruling dpp, whose candidate, William Lai, is polling at 30-40%. Since October 14th the tpp and kmt have indeed been holding talks on a possible joint ticket. They have until November 24th, the registration deadline for presidential candidates, to unite. Otherwise, Mr Lai, Taiwan’s vice-president, could be in line for an easy win. 柯先生和侯先生都似乎無法單獨獲勝。前市長的崛起主要是以國民黨為代價;在2020年臺灣總統選舉中,國民黨候選人獲得了近40%的選票。而臺灣製造商富士康的億萬富翁創始人郭台銘作為一個自大的獨立候選人最後參選,進一步分裂了反民進黨的選票。然而,如果柯先生和侯先生能夠達成協議,將他們的黨派團結在一個候選人後面,情況將會改變。他們可能會擊敗執政的民進黨,該黨的候選人賴清德的支持率在30-40%之間。自10月14日以來,臺灣民眾黨和國民黨確實一直在就可能的聯合候選人進行討論。 他們有時間到11月24日,也就是總統候選人的登記截止日期前,來團結一致。否則,台灣副總統賴先生可能會輕鬆獲勝。
In an interview with The Economist, Mr Ko draws a chart with the dpp and kmt at opposing ends of an ideological spectrum. He puts himself somewhere between them, as a “pragmatic” alternative. For 30 years Taiwanese politics has been consumed by a “meaningless” debate about unification and independence, he says. Both are “impossible”, in his view, because America will not allow unification and China will not allow independence. “Young people, especially intellectuals, are tired of seeing us spend so much time debating something that cannot be resolved,” he says. Instead he vows to focus on domestic concerns like jobs and housing. 在接受《經濟學人》採訪時,柯先生畫了一張圖,將民進黨和國民黨放在意識形態光譜的兩端。他將自己定位在兩者之間,作為一種“務實”的選擇。他表示,30年來,臺灣政治一直被關於統一和獨立的“無意義”辯論所消耗。在他看來,這兩者都是“不可能的”,因為美國不會允許統一,中國也不會允許獨立。“年輕人,尤其是知識份子,厭倦了看到我們花費如此多的時間辯論一個無法解決的問題,”他說。相反,他發誓將專注於國內關切,如就業和住房問題。
This is a popular message. A recent survey by Commonwealth, a magazine, suggests most tpp supporters think economic development should be the next president’s priority. Yet the survey also illustrates the limits of the tpp’s appeal. It finds 46% of voters are worried about a possible war between Taiwan and China in the next five years. It also affirms that dpp supporters mainly worry about national security and kmt supporters about relations with China. Though domestic policy matters, China is the big issue in national elections. 這是一則熱門訊息。《共和》雜誌最近的一項調查顯示,大多數支持跨太平洋夥伴關係協定(TPP)的人認為經濟發展應該是下一任總統的首要任務。然而,該調查也顯示了TPP吸引力的局限性。調查發現,46%的選民擔心未來五年台灣和中國之間可能爆發戰爭。它還證實,民進黨(DPP)支持者主要擔心國家安全,而國民黨(KMT)支持者則關注與中國的關係。儘管國內政策也很重要,但中國是國家選舉中的重大議題。
Mr Ko’s position on China is close to the kmt’s. Both he and Mr Hou criticise the dpp for its inability to engage directly with the Chinese Communist Party. Chinese authorities have cut off communications with the dpp government because it refuses to state that Taiwan and mainland China belong to the same country. The kmt says it could reopen dialogue by returning to the 1992 consensus, a deliberately vague agreement between the mainland and Taiwanese authorities that there is “only one China but with multiple interpretations”. This was the basis for strong cross-straits ties during the kmt administration of President Ma Ying-jeou in 2008-16. Returning to it could reduce regional tensions, says Andrew Hsia, the kmt’s vice-chairman. 柯先生對中國的立場接近國民黨。他和侯先生都批評民進黨無法直接與中國共產黨接觸。中國當局已經中斷與民進黨政府的溝通,因為後者拒絕承認臺灣和中國大陸屬於同一個國家。國民黨表示,通過回歸1992年的共識,即大陸和臺灣當局之間的一個故意模糊的協議,即“只有一個中國,但有多種解釋”,可以重新開啟對話。這是國民黨在2008年至2016年馬英九總統執政期間建立強大兩岸關係的基礎。國民黨副主席夏立言表示,回歸這一共識可以減少地區緊張局勢。
But the mainland is not as flexible as it used to be. In 2019 Xi Jinping, China’s president, gave a speech linking the 1992 consensus with the mainland’s one-China principle and proposed a “one country, two systems” formula for incorporating Taiwan. He did not mention the “multiple interpretations” phrase cherished by the kmt. Mr Xi also stated that the Taiwan problem should not be passed “from one generation to the next”. That speech “set the tone” for a more assertive Chinese policy on Taiwan, says Yoshiyuki Ogasawara of the Tokyo University of Foreign Studies. 但大陸已不像以前那麼靈活。2019年,中國國家主席習近平在一次演講中將1992共識與大陸的一個中國原則聯繫在一起,並提出了一個「一國兩制」的方案來納入台灣。他沒有提到國民黨珍視的「多種解釋」詞語。習近平還表示,台灣問題不應該「世世代代傳下去」。東京外國語大學的小笠原義之表示,這次演講為中國對台灣採取更有力的政策「定調」。
kmt leaders acknowledge that Mr Xi is pushing harder for unification than they are. Revelations this week that Foxconn’s tax affairs and land use are being investigated in China have only increased doubts about the mainland’s forbearance; many Taiwanese assume this is a tactic to put pressure on Mr Gou. “We are not naive,” says Mr Hsia, who has met top officials on several recent trips to the mainland. But the kmt still believes there is room for manoeuvre. Last year a Chinese state-run newspaper published an online commentary with the headline: “There is only one China, there are no multiple interpretations.” The article was withdrawn after the kmt called Beijing to complain—demonstrating the party’s influence, says Mr Hsia. 國民黨領導人承認,習近平先生對統一的推動力度比他們更大。本週揭示的富士康在中國的稅務和土地使用被調查的消息,只增加了對大陸忍耐力的疑慮;許多台灣人認為這是一種對郭台銘施壓的策略。夏先生說:“我們不是天真的人”,他最近幾次訪問大陸時曾與高層官員會面。但國民黨仍然相信有機動的空間。去年,一家中國國有報紙發表了一篇網上評論,標題是:“只有一個中國,沒有多種解釋。”該文章在國民黨向北京投訴後被撤下,夏先生表示這證明了該黨的影響力。
Taiwanese voters are more pessimistic. Most no longer believe in the viability of the 1992 consensus. Many have also lost faith in the kmt’s claim to prioritise Taiwanese sovereignty over its supporters’ interests. The term maiban, or “compradors”, is used to refer to Taiwanese companies that profited from investments in the mainland under Mr Ma. Mr Ko also slams the kmt for the maiban phenomenon. The party is “too submissive to China”, he says. It has “lost the Taiwanese people’s trust”. 台灣選民更加悲觀。大多數人不再相信1992共識的可行性。許多人也對國民黨聲稱將台灣主權置於支持者利益之上失去了信心。「買辦」這個詞用來指稱在馬英九時期從在大陸投資中獲利的台灣企業。柯文哲先生也批評國民黨的「買辦現象」。他說這個政黨「對中國太過順從」,已經「失去了台灣人民的信任」。
Even so, most Taiwanese want dialogue with China. Asked which was more important, cross-strait or international (meaning external but non-China) relations, about a third of voters chose international, while a fifth said cross-strait. Almost half said Taiwan should prioritise both. 即便如此,大多數台灣人仍希望與中國對話。當被問及兩者之間哪個更重要,即兩岸關係或國際(指的是與中國以外的外部關係)關係,約三分之一的選民選擇了國際,而五分之一的人選擇了兩岸關係。近一半的人表示台灣應該兼顧兩者。
That suggests many Taiwanese want a more flexible approach to China than the dpp’s, but a tougher one than the kmt’s. Mr Ko is benefiting from this. He says he has asked Chinese authorities to consider using an alternative formula, which would be less divisive than the 1992 consensus. They are “thinking about it”, he claims. It is not clear what this new formula would be, though Mr Ko has previously proposed the phrase “Two sides of the strait, one family” as a basis for cross-strait relations. 這表明許多台灣人希望對待中國的方式比民進黨更靈活,但比國民黨更堅定。柯先生正在從中受益。他表示已要求中國當局考慮使用一種替代方案,這種方案比1992年共識更具凝聚力。他聲稱他們正在「考慮中」。目前尚不清楚這種新方案是什麼,不過柯先生之前曾提出「兩岸一家親」作為兩岸關係的基礎。
More important than any new formula, he says, is to reset the dial. He vows to stress Taiwan’s shared heritage with China, promote people-to-people exchanges and avoid political rows. He cites a Chinese saying: “If you have good relations, anything can be discussed. If you have bad relations, nothing can be discussed.” 他表示,比任何新的公式更重要的是重新調整指針。他發誓要強調台灣與中國的共同文化底蘊,促進人民之間的交流,避免政治爭議。他引用了一句中國諺語:“有好的關係,什麼都可以討論;有壞的關係,什麼都無法討論。”
That is in step with the kmt. Yet the opposition parties are struggling to unite. After their first meeting each accused the other of being disingenuous. Mr Ko told The Economist he would only agree to a coalition that could win—and that this meant he must be its presidential candidate. It is possible. The kmt covets the tpp’s young supporters. “No one under 40 will vote for the kmt,” says Mr Ko. His kmt counterpart, Mr Hou, has suggested he might accept being Mr Ko’s running-mate. 這與國民黨保持一致。然而,反對黨卻在努力團結。在第一次會議後,每個人都指責對方不誠實。柯先生告訴《經濟學人》他只會同意一個能夠贏得選舉的聯合政府,這意味著他必須成為總統候選人。這是可能的。國民黨渴望獲得TPP的年輕支持者。柯先生說:“沒有人在40歲以下會投票給國民黨。”柯暗示他的國民黨對手侯先生可能要接受成為柯先生的競選夥伴。
But that would be a bitter pill for the kmt. It is much larger, older and better organised than the tpp. And Mr Ko’s derisive comments about the party do not augur well for his dealmaking powers: the kmt is a “big old brother” that “cannot swallow” its pride, he says. Moreover, even if the two parties could agree on the top of the ticket, they would need to work out an acceptable distribution of cabinet members, something they are only beginning to discuss. If they can fix these issues over the next month, Taiwan could be in for a very tight race. But don’t hold your breath. 但這對國民黨來說將是一顆苦藥。它比TPP更大、更古老、組織更完善。柯文哲對該黨的嘲諷言論並不預示著他在談判能力上的好兆頭:他說國民黨是一個「大哥哥」,「無法咽下」自己的驕傲。此外,即使兩黨能就候選人達成共識,他們還需要解決內閣成員的合理分配問題,這是他們才剛開始討論的事情。如果他們能在接下來的一個月內解決這些問題,台灣可能會迎來一場非常激烈的競爭。但不要抱太大期望。 =============================