修則 wrote:
大致上我們看到新聞講(恕刪)
美國撤退 所以塔利班成功 ??
我會這樣想 美國一年花幾十億美金 在阿富汗 這是無底洞
那幹脆 撤退 然後每年花1億美金 培植反對勢力
就是 拿根小牙籤 一直刺塔利班的背部
讓他們睡不安穩 這樣不是比較好
而且打塔利班 不用高科技
自動步槍 手榴彈 地雷 肩射反坦克武器
就夠了
個人積分：5699分
文章編號：82737540
個人積分：845分
文章編號：82740511
雖同是伊斯蘭教 新疆人普遍不接受阿富汗的極端保守教義 中阿邊界不大 地勢艱險 中方很容易管控
個人積分：2300分
文章編號：82741105
個人積分：5595分
文章編號：82741358
個人積分：14分
文章編號：82741520
是誰後來又去挑動內戰？
Afghan Civil War (1989–1992)
Afghan Civil War (1992–1996)
Cut Off the Arms Flow and Let Afghans Unite : With Soviets Gone, U.S. Should Demand a Referendum for Self-Determination
The Soviets have left Afghanistan, making the collapse of the besieged puppet regime in Kabul just a matter of time. President Bush has a unique opportunity to define a positive agenda for the future of that country, yet for now he has chosen to merely affirm that the United States will continue to supply the Afghan resistance with military assistance.
Rather than additional means of destruction, the Afghan people are most in need of constructive measures. The Bush Administration could insist that the Afghan people be given the right to self-determination and take the initiative by channeling future economic assistance only to a government so freely chosen. By doing so, it could help thwart blatant Pakistani and Iranian attempts at determining the future of Afghanistan and at fanning the flames of civil war.
The Afghan people have no desire that the United States micromanage their politics. Rather, they wish that the United States would stop colluding with the Pakistani generals in choosing the cast of political actors and writing the script for the future of their country.
Over the years Washington has been entrusting Pakistani military intelligence with the distribution of more than $2 billion in military and financial aid and with the allocation of Stinger missiles to the Afghan resistance.
As long as the Soviet army was occupying their country, Afghan refugees had no choice but to accept the price exacted by Pakistan. Pakistani generals not only insisted on picking seven individuals acceptable to them to act as leaders of the resistance based in Pakistan; they also considered it their privilege to decide how and when to favor any of these groups. Local leaders inside Afghanistan, in need of arms and money, had no choice but to declare affiliation with one of these parties. The departure of the Soviet forces, however, frees the resistance inside Afghanistan from this dependence. Should a legitimate interim government emerge, one reflecting the aspirations of the Afghan people and committed to the reconstruction of the country, the commanders are likely to support its authority.
But the situation as it stands now finds Islamabad frantically trying to give its seven-party alliance the mantle of legitimacy by convening a consultative council, or shoora . Simultaneously, Tehran is adding a sectarian dimension to the already intricate balancing act by demanding a significant role for eight Shiite parties that are based in Iran. Reports filtering out from inside Afghanistan also tell of Pakistani generals who have been urging resistance commanders to attack the cities, regardless of the bloodbath and the chaos that are sure to ensue. Only the restraint shown by commanders of the resistance has thus far prevented the execution of these plans.
In the absence of an interim government truly representative of the Afghan people, there is no incentive for the peaceful surrender of Kabul and other cities still in the hands of the Soviet-backed regime. Nearly 3 million civilians, locked in besieged Kabul and already on the brink of starvation, are sure to suffer tremendous losses should the encircling resistance groups attack the capital.
Surely the slaughtering of civilians of Kabul is not what the Bush Administration wants its “kinder, gentler America” to contribute to.
There is still time for Bush to act decisively by delaying any shipment of arms and clearly supporting a political solution. The President can call for a referendum under the auspices of the United Nations --a logical choice following the Geneva accords of last April that made the withdrawal of the Soviet forces possible. The referendum would be held simultaneously in Pakistan, Iran and the parts of Afghanistan that are free of the Soviet-backed regime.
Such a referendum would ascertain the relative weight of each of the 15 pro-Pakistani or pro-Iranian parties, as well as that of independent groups or leaders. It would allow the emergence of a responsible and accountable leadership that the Afghan people could call their own.
After all, let us not forget that, aside from the nine years of Soviet occupation, Afghanistan can boast of nearly 300 years of recorded history of self-rule. And, as one resistance commander has been quoted by Western correspondents, there can be no compromise on “liberty, dignity and honor.” If Washington ceases to view Afghans as mercenaries in its anti-Soviet crusade, it might be able to understand their longings for independence, peace and prosperity.
蘇聯人已經離開了阿富汗，使得被圍困在喀布爾的傀儡政權的崩潰只是一個時間問題。布什總統有一個獨特的機會為這個國家的未來確定一個積極的議程，然而現在他卻選擇僅僅申明美國將繼續向阿富汗抵抗力量提供軍事援助。
阿富汗人民最需要的不是額外的破壞手段，而是建設性的措施。布什政府可以堅持給予阿富汗人民自決的權利，並採取主動，將未來的經濟援助只提供給一個自由選擇的政府。通過這樣做，它可以幫助挫敗巴基斯坦和伊朗公然決定阿富汗的未來和煽動內戰的企圖。
阿富汗人民並不希望美國對他們的政治進行微觀管理。相反，他們希望美國停止與巴基斯坦將軍們勾結，選擇政治演員，為他們國家的未來編寫劇本。
多年來，華盛頓一直委託巴基斯坦軍事情報部門分配超過20億美元的軍事和財政援助，並向阿富汗抵抗組織分配 "毒刺 "導彈。
只要蘇軍還在佔領他們的國家，阿富汗難民就別無選擇，只能接受巴基斯坦索取的代價。巴基斯坦的將軍們不僅堅持挑選他們可以接受的七個人作為駐紮在巴基斯坦的抵抗組織的領導人；他們還認為自己有特權決定如何和何時偏袒這些團體中的任何一個。阿富汗境內的地方領導人由於需要武器和金錢，別無選擇，只能宣布隸屬於這些政黨之一。然而，蘇軍的離開使阿富汗境內的抵抗力量擺脫了這種依賴性。如果出現一個合法的臨時政府，一個反映阿富汗人民的願望並致力於國家重建的政府，指揮官們可能會支持其權力。
但目前的情況是，伊斯蘭堡瘋狂地試圖通過召開協商會議（或稱shoora）來給其七黨聯盟披上合法的外衣。同時，德黑蘭要求設在伊朗的八個什葉派政黨發揮重要作用，從而為已經錯綜複雜的平衡行動增添了教派色彩。從阿富汗內部傳出的報告還顯示，巴基斯坦將軍一直在敦促抵抗組織的指揮官攻擊城市，而不顧肯定會發生的流血和混亂。到目前為止，只有抵抗組織的指揮官表現出的克制才阻止了這些計劃的實施。
在沒有一個真正代表阿富汗人民的臨時政府的情況下，喀布爾和其他仍在蘇聯支持的政權手中的城市沒有和平投降的動力。近300萬平民被圍困在喀布爾，已經處於飢餓的邊緣，如果被包圍的抵抗組織進攻首都，他們肯定會遭受巨大的損失。
當然，對喀布爾平民的屠殺不是布什政府希望其 "更仁慈、更溫和的美國 "所促成的。
布什仍有時間採取果斷行動，推遲任何武器的運輸，並明確支持政治解決方案。總統可以呼籲在聯合國的主持下舉行全民公決--這是繼去年4月使蘇聯軍隊撤出的日內瓦協議之後的一個合理選擇。全民公決將在巴基斯坦、伊朗和阿富汗沒有蘇聯支持的政權的地區同時舉行。
這樣的公投將確定15個親巴基斯坦或親伊朗的政黨以及獨立團體或領導人的相對分量。它將允許出現一個負責任的、有責任感的、阿富汗人民可以稱之為自己的領導人。
畢竟，我們不要忘記，除了九年的蘇聯佔領之外，阿富汗可以誇耀近300年的有記錄的自治歷史。而且，正如西方記者所引述的一位抵抗組織的指揮官所說，在 "自由、尊嚴和榮譽 "方面不能有任何妥協。如果華盛頓不再將阿富汗人視為其反蘇戰役中的僱傭兵，它也許能夠理解他們對獨立、和平和繁榮的渴望。
個人積分：945分
文章編號：82742383
個人積分：14分
文章編號：82742679
December 2014: What They Left Behind: The Soviet Union in Afghanistan
Today, the most visible remnants of the Soviet era in Kabul are the prefabricated concrete residential complexes known as mikrorayon (from the Russian). They stand alongside mud houses clinging atop mountains and the traditional brick and wood houses of the inner city. And they were designed as a means to use architecture—especially architectures of living spaces—to transform the social and cultural practices of Afghans to match Soviet visions of modernity.
今天，喀布尔最明显的苏联时代的遗迹是被称为mikrorayon（来自俄语）的预制混凝土住宅群。它们与依附在山顶的泥土房和内城的传统砖木结构房屋并列。它们被设计成一种手段，利用建筑--特别是生活空间的建筑--来改变阿富汗人的社会和文化习俗，以配合苏联的现代性愿景。
小区（英語：Microdistrict，俄語：микрорайо́н，烏克蘭語：мікрорайон）是指苏联设计的一种居住建筑群规划区，在今天的俄罗斯及一些前苏联国家依然沿用了这一概念。中华人民共和国于1957年从苏联引入“小区”规划理念。[1]
個人積分：14分
文章編號：82742756
cckm wrote:
就看塔利班讓不讓他們學而已,
現代社會需要更多知識,
除非塔利班還想搞回到過去那一套,
不然會需要更多受教育的人.
伊斯蘭社會對「有的沒的歷史/政治/公民教育」其實很重視,
當然是以實踐教義為出發點,用伊斯蘭的角度教這些課程,
極端伊斯蘭社會,
大多人所能學習的恐怕也只有這些.
伊斯蘭世界許多地方都已世俗化,
先知可曾說過不准信徒學習其它知識???
他們有開記者會，從Doha回到Kabul的發言人開的，可以聽一下
'We will honour women's rights (within Islamic law)': Taliban spokesman holds first news conference in Kabul and promises they won't persecute women or take revenge against anyone - as deputy leader returns after 20 years in exile
Transcript of Taliban’s first news conference in Kabul
個人積分：4294分
文章編號：82743406
個人積分：14分
文章編號：82744108
孫中山也知道
近年以美洲逐客，檀岛禁工，各口茶商又多亏折，乡间景况大逊前时，觅食农民尤为不易。文思所以广其农利，欲去禾而树桑，通〔迨〕为考核地质，知其颇不宜于种桑，而甚宜于波毕。近以愤于英人禁烟之议难成，遂劝农人栽鸦片，旧岁于农隙试之，其浆果与印度公土无异，每亩可获利数十金。现已群相仿效，户户欲栽，今冬农隙所种必广。此无碍于农田而有补于漏卮，亦一时权宜之计也。他日盛行，必能尽夺印烟之利，盖其气味较公土为尤佳，迥非川滇各土之可比。去冬所产数斤，凡嗜阿芙蓉之癖者争相购吸，以此决其能夺印烟之利也必矣。印烟之利既夺，英人可不勉而自禁，英人既禁，我可不栽，此时而申禁吸之令，则百年大患可崇朝而灭矣。劝种罂粟，实禁鸦片之权舆也。由栽烟一事观之，则知农民之见利必趋，群相仿效，到处皆然，是则农政之兴，甚易措手。其法先设农师学堂一所，选好学博物之士课之，三年有成，然后派往各省分设学堂，以课农家聪颖子弟。又每省设立农艺博览会一所，与学堂相表里，广集各方之物产，时与老农互相考证。此办法之纲领也，至其详细节目，当另著他编，条分缕晰，可以坐言而起行，所谓非欲徒托空言者此也
