台灣軍方是一個空殼...

Taiwan's Military Is a Hollow Shell
台灣軍方是一個空殼

Paul Huang

As threats of military aggression from China grow, the island nation of Taiwan needs a credible military deterrent more than ever. But Taiwan's military is in a crisis it can barely admit exists.
隨著來自中國的軍事侵略威脅越來越大，台灣島國比以往任何時候都更需要可靠的軍事威懾力量。但是台灣軍方正處於危機之中，幾乎無法承認其存在。

Even as the military refits itself with flashy U.S. arms purchases, such as M1 Abrams tanks and F-16V fighter jets, its front-line units are hollowed out, and the entire reserve system is so dysfunctional that few experts or serving military personnel believe it can make a real military contribution in the event of a war. These problems are well documented but continue to be downplayed, if not outright ignored, by Taiwan's political leadership—and there is no clear plan to solve the crisis.
即使軍方通過購買諸如M1艾布拉姆斯坦克（M1 Abrams）坦克和F-16V戰鬥機之類的美軍武器來進行自我改裝，其前線單位也被挖空了，整個後備系統仍然功能失常，幾乎沒有專家或在職軍事人員相信這一點。可以在戰爭中做出真正的軍事貢獻。這些問題有據可查，但仍被台灣政治領導人輕描淡寫，甚至被人們徹底淡化，即使沒有明確的計劃來解決危機。

On paper, Taiwan's Ministry of National Defence (MND) has 215,000 budgeted positions among all branches, of which 188,000 are soldiers and the rest civilian employees. Only 153,000 of those positions were filled in 2018—just 81 percent of the personnel the military should have. But even that number doesn't tell the complete story.
從表面上看，台灣國防部在所有分支機構中有215,000個預算職位，其中188,000為士兵，其餘為文職僱員。到2018年，這些職位中只有153,000個被填補，僅占軍隊應有人員的81％。但是，即使這個數字也不能說明全部情況。

According to a Taiwanese army lieutenant colonel in active service, who asked for only his last name, Lin, to be used, all the army's front-line combat units he knows of—including armour, mechanized infantry, and artillery troops—currently have effective manpower levels of between 60 and 80 percent. This figure is consistent with Taiwanese media reports, which cite MND figures provided to Taiwan's parliament, the Legislative Yuan, acknowledging that few front-line units have more than 80 percent of their positions filled.
根據現役的台灣陸軍中校的說法，他只要求使用姓林，他知道的陸軍所有前線作戰單位（包括裝甲部隊，機械化步兵和砲兵）目前都有效人力水平在60％至80％之間。這個數字與台灣媒體的報導相吻合。台灣媒體援引MND提供給台灣議會立法院的數字，承認很少一線部隊的空缺超過80％。

「That number might not seem so bad until you realize it means at least a third of your tanks are useless in a war because there's no one to man them,」 said Lin, who most recently served as a battalion commander within one of army's armour brigades.
林說：“這個數字似乎還不算糟糕，直到你意識到這意味著至少有三分之一的坦克在戰爭中毫無用處，因為沒有人來操縱它們。”林最近擔任陸軍一個裝甲營的營長。旅。

The personnel shortfalls are a clear consequence of the ill-executed transition from conscription to an all-volunteer military over the past few years. It was a political decision made during Ma Ying-jeou's administration and continued by current President Tsai Ing-wen, despite their coming from different parties. And despite Tsai's tough rhetoric about defending Taiwan during her successful recent reelection bid, and her vow to thwart Chinese aggression, she has shown no sign of stepping in to fix the problems.
人員短缺是過去幾年從征兵制向志願軍全面過渡的結果。這是馬英九執政期間做出的一項政治決定，儘管他們來自不同政黨，但現任總統蔡英文仍然繼續。儘管蔡在最近的成功連任中堅決捍衛台灣，並發誓要挫敗中國的侵略，但她並沒有顯示出介入解決這些問題的跡象。

Universal conscription is mandated in Article 20 of the Taiwanese Constitution, as in several other countries that face an imminent military threat, such as South Korea or Israel (where women are included but some minorities excluded). For some years, before 2017, the term of conscription service in Taiwan was just a year, which was already short compared with South Korea's 18-22 months, depending on the military branch, or Israel's 32 months. Most officers felt that the single year of service wasn't enough for the military to utilize draftees' full potential but enough to at least turn a recruit into an average soldier.
《台灣憲法》第20條規定，必須實行普遍徵兵制，在其他一些面臨迫在眉睫的軍事威脅的國家中，例如韓國或以色列（其中包括婦女，但不包括某些少數民族）。在2017年之前的幾年中，台灣的徵兵服務期限僅為一年，與韓國的18-22個月相比有所縮短，具體取決於軍事部門，也取決於以色列的32個月。大多數軍官認為，僅服役一年不足以使軍隊充分利用徵兵人員的全部潛能，但至少足以使新兵成為普通士兵。

But 2017』s changes slashed the conscription period to just four months. Most draftees serve even less, as up to two weeks can be deducted if they've completed military training classes in high school and college. The four-month conscripts typically receive five weeks of basic training before they are assigned to field units for more specialty training. But they're more a burden than an aid, not treated seriously by career or non-commissioned officers as their short stays mean they are seen as guests rather than soldiers.
但是2017年的變更將應徵期縮短到了四個月。大多數徵兵人員的服役期甚至更少，因為如果他們在高中和大學完成軍事訓練課程，則最多可以扣除兩個星期。通常，為期四個月的應徵者應接受為期五週的基礎培訓，然後再分配給現場單位進行更多專業培訓。但是，與其說他們是援助，不如說是他們的負擔，沒有得到職業或士官的認真對待，因為他們短暫的停留意味著他們被視為客人而不是士兵。

「By design, they don't participate in any field exercise or combat readiness training anyway,」 Lin said. 「We just tell them to stay safe and don't get into trouble. It's basically a summer camp.」 Several individuals who recently completed this four-month service described similar experiences in interviews.
“通過設計，他們無論如何都不參與任何野外鍛煉或戰鬥準備訓練，”林說。 “我們只是告訴他們要安全，不要惹麻煩。基本上，這是一個夏令營。

One of the stated aims of the all-volunteer reform was to professionalize the service, staffing the military's rank and file with a cadre of career-oriented volunteer soldiers who usually serve a minimum term of four years. Despite MND's talking point that each year's recruitment drive always hits the set targets and brings with it a fresh crop of volunteers, the rushed transition to an all-volunteer military has clearly damaged the Taiwanese army's manpower pool—especially on the front line.
全志願人員改革的既定目標之一是使服務專業化，為軍隊官兵配備一支以職業為導向的志願軍，通常至少任期四年。儘管MND談論的觀點是，每年的招募努力總是能達到既定目標，並帶來了新的志願者，但匆忙過渡到全志願軍明顯地損害了台灣軍隊的人力資源，尤其是在一線。

The reason for the hollowing out of front-line troops is simple. Unlike conscripts, who could be assigned entirely based on to the needs of the military, volunteer soldiers among the lower enlisted ranks can and usually do seek transfers to units considered desirable—rear-echelon troops such as training schools, garrison units, signal corps, and so forth. Although transfer opportunities are limited, soldiers almost always find a way. This means that armour, mechanized infantry, and artillery units are always in desperate shortage of enlisted soldiers—even though they are expected to be the ones bearing the brunt of ground fighting against the formidable People's Liberation Army (PLA) ground force if it comes ashore.
挖空一線部隊的原因很簡單。不像應徵入伍者，他們可以完全根據軍隊的需要來分配，而入伍軍銜較低的志願軍則可以而且通常確實尋求轉移到被認為可取的部隊，例如訓練學校，駐軍部隊，信號軍，等等。儘管調動機會有限，但士兵幾乎總能找到辦法。這意味著裝甲兵，機械化步兵和火砲部隊總是極度短缺應徵入伍的士兵—即使他們被迫在地面上與強大的人民解放軍（PLA）地面部隊作戰，首當其衝， 。

A popular yet cynical explanation as to why these Taiwanese soldiers dislike front-line units simply postulates a common aversion to tougher training and combat duty. But interviews with several enlisted ranks painted a more complex picture. Most complained that the food and living conditions left much to be desired—front-line soldiers must split their time between bases and on field exercises. That, on top of the fact they have far more weapons, vehicles, and equipment to clean and maintain, means these posts are perceived as more work for little reward. The existing shortages also cause an even heavier burden of work on the soldiers left—prompting more of them to put in for transfers.
關於這些台灣士兵為何不喜歡前線部隊的一種流行而憤世嫉俗的解釋，只是簡單地假定人們普遍厭惡更嚴格的訓練和戰鬥職責。但是對幾個入伍軍官的採訪卻描繪了一個更為複雜的畫面。多數人抱怨食物和生活條件迫切需要-前線士兵必須在基地和野戰之間分配時間。除了擁有更多的武器，車輛和設備需要清潔和維護外，這意味著這些職位被認為是更多的工作，卻沒有什麼回報。現有的短缺也給剩下的士兵帶來了更大的工作負擔，促使更多的士兵被調動。

Polls show varied public opinion on these issues. In 2015, one legislator cited a poll that showed almost 60 support for a return to conscription. In response, the MND cited another poll that claimed 60 percent were satisfied with the transition to all-volunteer forces. At the end of the day, it all seems to come down to how the question is phrased by the pollsters.
民意測驗顯示出對這些問題的不同輿論。 2015年，一位立法者引用了一項民意測驗，結果顯示將近60人支持重新徵兵。作為回應，國防部引用了另一項民意測驗，稱60％的人對向全志願部隊的過渡感到滿意。歸根結底，這似乎都取決於民意測驗人員如何表達這個問題。

No matter which poll you believe, it is clear that the two successive presidents over the past decade, Ma and Tsai, had little or no political interest in the political hassle of bringing back the longer conscription length, despite the evidence of the damage being done to military readiness. Even Kaohsiung Mayor Han Kuo-yu, who lost in the recent presidential election representing the Kuomintang (KMT) party, also declined to advocate a complete return to conscription but proposed a 「hybrid approach」 that he did not specify the details for.
無論您相信哪個民意測驗，很明顯，在過去的十年中，連續兩次當選總統馬雲和蔡對政治問題的政治興趣幾乎沒有，甚至根本沒有，因為政治上的麻煩是要恢復更長的徵兵期限，儘管有證據表明遭到了破壞。做好軍事準備。即使是在代表國民黨的最近總統選舉中失利的高雄市長韓國Han，也拒絕主張完全恢復徵兵制，但提出了“混合辦法”，他沒有具體說明。

Chieh Chung, a senior assistant research fellow at Taiwan's National Policy Foundation, commented that the personnel shortage is a problem well documented by the military itself but has never entered their calculations. Chung, who has worked for several years in Taiwan's parliament as a legislative advisor focusing on defence issues, said the military's own exercises and computer simulations always assume all units would have at least 90 percent fighting strength at the beginning of a war—an assumption that might have been true in the conscription era but is a far cry from reality today.
台灣國家政策基金會高級助理研究員重傑評論說，人員短缺是軍方本身已充分記錄在案的問題，但從未進行過計算。在台灣議會工作了數年的立法顧問專注於國防問題的鐘錶示，軍方自己的演習和計算機模擬始終假定所有單位在戰爭開始時將擁有至少90％的戰鬥力。在徵兵時代也許是正確的，但與現實相去甚遠。

Several officers who have participated in the computer-simulated phase of the annual Han Kuang exercises in recent years also pointed out this obvious flaw. That raises the question of how many of the Taiwanese military's simulations of its own ability to hold off a Chinese invasion are based on now purely hypothetical soldiers.
近年來，參加年度漢光練習計算機模擬階段的幾名官員也指出了這一明顯的缺陷。這就提出了一個問題，即台灣軍方有多少模擬其自身抵抗中國侵略能力的模擬是基於現在純粹是假想的士兵。

These personnel issues would not be so serious if the military had a functional reserve force. On paper, this enormous reserve force is said to be more than 2 million strong.
如果軍隊有一支預備役部隊，這些人員問題就不會那麼嚴重。 在紙面上，據說這種龐大的後備力量超過200萬。

Once activated, these reservists are supposed to fill existing shortages across regular field units, and reinforce casualties, while creating fresh reserve formations from virtually nothing to bolster overall defence, according to the Reserve Command』s own words.
根據預備役司令部自己的話，這些後備役人員一旦被激活，就可以填補常規野戰部隊現有的人員短缺，並增加人員傷亡，同時從幾乎一無所有創建新的後備編隊，以增強總體防禦能力。

Just about everything in these talking points is pure fantasy, according to James Huang, a retired army lieutenant colonel who has since become a prolific writer on defence issues and military history, with many followers on Facebook. Huang said there was 「no way whatsoever」 any of Taiwan's reserves would reinforce existing field units, despite the proven success of the system elsewhere in the world, especially Israel.
退休的陸軍中校詹姆斯·黃（James Huang）說，這些談話要點幾乎都是純屬幻想，此後就成為國防問題和軍事歷史上的多產作家，並在Facebook上有許多關注者。 黃說，儘管該系統在世界其他地方，尤其是以色列，已經證明是成功的，但台灣的任何“後備力量”都無法加強現有的野戰部隊。

That's the case regardless of whether the reservist is a conscript with four months' training or a five-year veteran paratrooper just discharged from the special forces. The established practice of Taiwan's Reserve Command, according to Huang, is not to send reservists back to their previous units but to lump everyone together into the newly activated reserve infantry brigades that possess no specialty, no vehicles, and no equipment except rifles (often older types) and are led by called-up reservist officers who have little experience commanding such ad hoc units.
無論預備役人員是剛剛接受了四個月訓練的應徵入伍者，還是剛剛從特種部隊退役的五年退伍軍人，都屬於這種情況。根據黃仁勳的說法，台灣預備役司令部的既定做法不是將預備役人員遣返其先前的部隊，而是將所有人聚集在一起，新成立的預備役步兵旅，除了步槍外，這些步兵旅沒有步槍（通常是較老的步槍）類型），並由召集的預備役軍官領導，這些人幾乎沒有指揮這類特設部隊的經驗。

In theory, all soldiers and officers (both conscripts and volunteers) are automatically enrolled as reservists on being discharged from active service. They are called up at most once every two years by the Reserve Command to receive refresher training for five to seven days. In practice, such training rarely consists of more than just basic drills and a short practice session at the rifle range. A reservist corporal who was a veteran M60 tank gunner, for example, will be activated only as an infantry rifleman even if one of the army's active armour brigades has tanks sitting unmanned in the base.
從理論上講，所有士兵和軍官（應徵入伍者和志願者）都將在退役後自動註冊為預備役人員。預備役司令部每兩年最多召喚一次他們，接受為期五到七天的進修培訓。實際上，這種訓練很少包括基本訓練和步槍範圍內的簡短練習。舉例來說，一名曾是M60坦克砲手的資深預備役下士，即使是一支陸軍現役裝甲旅的無人駕駛坦克，也只能作為步兵來使用。

「If we go to war, the soldiers currently on roster are all that we have,」 said Lin, the lieutenant colonel, who pointed out that he had never heard of any plan to reinforce units he commanded with reserve soldiers. 「At best, they might start combining depleted units. We are supposed to fight until everyone is dead or can't fight anymore.」
“如果我們打仗，目前只有名冊上的士兵，”林少校說。他指出，他從未聽說過有任何計劃來加強他與預備役士兵一起指揮的部隊的計劃。 “充其量，他們可能會開始合併耗盡的單位。我們應該戰鬥直到所有人都死了或者再也不能戰鬥了。''

And even if Taiwan somehow manages to muster dozens of fresh reserve infantry brigades before Chinese troops come ashore, Huang said they would be little more than cannon fodder consider how poorly the military has trained them in peacetime and the fact that there is not even a clear plan to fit them into the overall defence strategy.
即使台灣以某種方式設法在中國軍隊上岸之前召集了數十個新鮮的後備步兵旅，黃說，考慮到軍方在和平時期對他們的訓練有多麼糟糕，他們只不過是大砲的飼料而已。計劃使其適合整體防禦策略。

「Show me 2 million rifles in the stockpile, and I will believe Taiwan has a 2-million-strong reserve force,」 Huang said. 「The military can't even tell how many reserve troops they will need to activate across Taiwan, let alone where and how to deploy them when the shooting starts across the Taiwan Strait.」
黃說：“給我看一下庫存的200萬支步槍，我相信台灣有200萬強大的後備力量。” “軍方甚至無法說出他們需要在台灣各地動用多少後備部隊，更不用說在台灣海峽兩岸槍擊事件開始時在哪里以及如何部署他們了。”

Other military officers and defence experts confirmed the problems Huang cited. According to Jyun-yi Lee, an assistant research fellow at the Institute for National Defence and Security Research, a recently created think tank affiliated with Taiwan's MND: 「It's indeed clear to most of us that Taiwan's reserve system, as it currently stands, will not contribute much to the military's fighting strength, if at all. No one is pretending soldiers trained by four-month conscription will be effective. They exist for political, not military, reasons. Politicians don't want to bring back longer conscription or tougher reserve training, as they fear doing so might make them unpopular.」
其他軍官和國防專家也證實了黃所提到的問題。國防與安全研究所的助理研究員李佳怡（音譯）說，這是台灣MND的一個新近成立的智囊團：“對於我們大多數人來說，的確很清楚，目前台灣的儲備系統將如果有的話，對軍隊的戰鬥力沒有多大貢獻。沒有人會假裝接受為期四個月的徵兵訓練的士兵有效。它們的存在是出於政治而非軍事原因。政客們不想再招募更長的徵兵或進行更嚴格的預備役訓練，因為他們擔心這樣做會使他們不受歡迎。''

To its credit, Taiwan's MND finally began an experimental 「reserve warrior program」 in recent years that seeks to put skilled veterans back to their original units for refresher training up to a few days per month. Some 214 veterans were said to have signed up in 2019, which is obviously too low to function as a regular reserve force. The program so far seems to matter more to the air force, as it finally provides a channel for retired military pilots to fly again, according to one air force lieutenant familiar with the matter. So far one F-16 pilot and one C-130 pilot reportedly have signed up for the program.
值得讚揚的是，台灣的MND終於在最近幾年開始了一項實驗性的“預備役士兵計劃”，該計劃旨在將熟練的退伍軍人放回原單位，以進行每月最多幾天的進修培訓。據說約有214名退伍軍人在2019年簽約，這顯然太低了，無法充當常規後備部隊。一位熟悉此事的空軍中尉說，到目前為止，該計劃似乎對空軍的影響更大，因為它最終為退休的軍方飛行員提供了再次飛行的渠道。據報導，到目前為止，已有1名F-16飛行員和1架C-130飛行員簽署了該計劃。

Former KMT legislator Hsu 「Jason」 Yu-Jen said U.S. Defence Department officials have privately expressed dismal assessments regarding Taiwan's current force level and reserve system. Hsu quoted Pentagon officials as saying in 2019 that Taiwan's buying of new F-16s and M1 Abram tanks by the Tsai administration was a 「nice political gesture」 yet they will hardly matter in a war when Taiwan cannot even man them properly in peacetime.
國民黨前立法會議員許玉仁說，美國國防部官員私下對台灣目前的部隊水平和後備製度表示了悲觀的評估。許援引五角大樓官員的話說，台灣在2019年購買蔡國政府購買的新的F-16和M1艾布拉姆坦克是一種“很好的政治姿態”，但是當台灣甚至在和平時期甚至無法妥善配備它們時，它們在戰爭中也沒有關係。

But saying the problem out loud is a tough task in itself when both Taiwan's international allies and the Taiwanese public want to hear a success story more than anything else—especially at a time when China's propaganda machine is running at full speed to portrait Taiwan's military as both incompetent and ineffective in the face of the PLA's rapid expansion and modernization.
但是，當台灣的國際盟友和台灣公眾都想比其他任何人都更能聽到成功的故事時，大聲說出問題本身就是一項艱鉅的任務，尤其是在中國的宣傳機器正在全速運轉以將台灣的軍事形象描述為面對中國人民解放軍的迅速擴張和現代化，它們既無能又無能。

「You have to acknowledge the existence of the problems before you can fix them,」 said James Huang, who noted that some among the military community object to his outspokenness, though he decided to speak on record for this report anyway. 「It's about time someone starts telling the truth.」
詹姆斯·黃說：“您必須先解決問題的存在，然後才能解決它們。”他指出，軍事界中有些人反對他的直言不諱，儘管他還是決定為此報告作記錄。 “是時候有人開始說實話了。”

https://www.chinatimes.com/realtimenews/20200217004468-260417?chdtv
https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/02/15/china-threat-invasion-conscription-taiwans-military-is-a-hollow-shell/
translate by google translate

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看着有點意思所以轉貼"翻譯"過來,
至於該如何解讀,各看倌自理了

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轉貼自巴哈s20012797的文章